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FAIRNESS REGULATION: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS
GONE
DONALD E. LIvELY*
Regulation that promotes constitutional values represents a particularly
honorable governmental intention. Affirmative facilitation of equal protec-
tion goals has been employed, for instance, to remedy some of the conse-
quences of past discrimination.' Impairments of the right to vote have been
dismantled, and fifteenth amendment concerns advanced, pursuant to the
Voting Rights Act. 2 On its face, "fairness" regulation of the broadcast
media may seem a similarly fetching methodology for promoting constitu-
tional interests. The fairness doctrine 3 evolved as a mechanism for promoting
the fundamental first amendment goal of content diversity4 in what has
become the dominant mass medium.' Given a modern media industry that
is heavily concentrated 6 and affords limited opportunities for individual
participation in the trade of ideas,7 fairness regulation has worked to retain
some of the imagery if not substance of a soapbox society.'
Unlike policies that promote fourteenth amendment and fifteenth
amendment values, 9 the fairness doctrine was promulgated without the force
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. EEOC,
478 U.S. 421, 448 (1986).
2. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966). The Voting Rights
Act has attracted increasing criticism, however, for subverting its own purposes. Court ordered
districting schemes calculated to ensure safe minority seats actually may dilute minority
representation in the broader political system. See A. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?
AFRMATIvE AcTIoN AND MNoRrny VOTING (1987).
3. The fairness doctrine, until its recent abandonment, imposed upon broadcasters a
two-part obligation consisting of a duty to present controversial issues of public importance
and a responsibility to provide contrasting viewpoints. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969). The FCC abolished the fairness doctrine in 1987. See In re Complaint
of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043 (1987). Companion principles, including the
personal attack and political editorial rules, endure at least for the time being. See 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.1920 (1987); Communications Act of 1934, § 315, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982).
4. See In The Matter of the Handling of Public Issues under the Fairness Doctrine and
the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 7 (1974) [hereinafter
Fairness Report].
5. In 1986, 98% of the nation's homes had at least one television, and 99% had at
least one radio. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT, OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
oF THE UNITED STATES 1987, No. 906, at 531 (1987) [hereinafter STATSTICAL ABSTRACT 1987].
The average household had nearly two televisions and over five radios. Id.
6. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248-54 (1974); CBS v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 182-92 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7. See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 248-54; CBS, 412 U.S. at 182-92,
8. In favoring a direct right of public access as an even stronger diversification
mechanism, Justice Brennan noted that "separation of the advocate from the expression of
his views... diminished the effectiveness of that expression." CBS, 412 U.S. at 189.
9. See, e.g., supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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or authority of a particularized constitutional enabling provision.' 0 The
absence of such a specific linkage alone would not subvert the viability of
the fairness doctrine if the provision actually served the purposes for which
it was constructed. Even apparent inconsonance with constitutional text
need not be fatal, as evidenced by the operation of affirmative action
concepts," provided constitutional interests and ends are accurately discerned
and serviced. The fairness principle in practice, however, has subverted
rather than promoted first amendment values.'
2
Recognizing that the fairness doctrine encouraged bland rather than
diverse programming, the Federal Communication Commission ("FCC")
abolished it in 1987.'1 Abandonment of the doctrine represented official
departure from a mechanism that the FCC had constructed and, despite
widespread criticism, persistently had endorsed.' 4 Having conceived the
fairness doctrine as a device for encouraging balanced presentation of
controversial public issues,15 the FCC eventually acknowledged the validity
of criticism that the fairness doctrine deterred rather than facilitated coverage
of those concerns.' 6 Government could not enforce the duty to raise con-
troversial issues without intolerably intruding upon the editorial process.'
7
10. The fourteenth and fifteenth amendments empower Congress to enforce their guar-
antees "by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XV,
§ 2.
11. Affirmative action policies, for instance, are calculated to promote values tied to the
constitutional guarantee that no State shall "deny to any person ... equal protection of the
laws," U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Affirmative hiring practices are designed to offset past
racial discrimination by employing a system of preferences, despite specific statutory language
that literally prohibits racial favoritism. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979) (holding that Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not
prevent employer from adopting affirmative action plan).
The fairness doctrine is at literal odds with a "freedom ... of the press" guarantee
directed toward disseminators rather than recipients of information. Policies seeming to deviate
from constitutional text may be tolerable, however, if in accord with an underlying spirit and
purpose that includes content diversification in the information marketplace. See Quincy Cable
TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1179 (1986).
12. See infra notes 31-46 and accompanying text. For further discussion of how the
fairness doctrine undermined the interests it was supposed to serve, see, for example, In The
Matter of Inquiry into § 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the
General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 159-88 (1985)
[hereinafter Fairness Report of 1985].
13. See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 1 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043 (1987); see also
In the Matter of Inquiry into § 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning
Alternatives to the General Fairness Doctrine Obligation of Broadcast Licensees, 2 F.C.C.
Rcd. 5272 (1987) [hereinafter Fairness Alternatives].
14. [O]ld age [did not] secure "the fairness doctrine from the tarnish of corrosive
controversy." In the Matter of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 703 (1976) (Comm'r Robinson
dissenting) [hereinafter Reconsideration of the Fairness Doctrine]. Despite widespread criticism
of fairness regulation, even after its constitutionality was upheld, the FCC until recently
continued to endorse it. See id.; Fairness Report, supra note 4.
15. See Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-78 (1969).
16. See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 5049-50 (1987).
17. See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
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For the most part, the FCC never applied the fairness doctrine forcefully.'8
The regulation nonetheless lurked as an intimidating presence for broad-
casters whose capacity to operate rested upon a government license, and
who were aware that few administrations had resisted the temptation to try
to manipulate it for political purposes.' 9
Given the poor constitutional and practical record of fairness regulation,
official efforts to reintroduce it are disquieting. The purpose of this essay
is to (1) examine the nature and failings of the fairness doctrine; (2) consider
arguments for its renewal; and (3) explain why attempted resurrection of
the fairness doctrine should be constitutionally doomed.
I. Tim NATURE AND FAmiNGs oF FAINEsS REGULATION
The concept of "fairness," as a governing principle of broadcasting,
predates the FCC. The original and enduring premise for such regulation
was that the public interest demanded officially created opportunities for
competing views on issues of public importance.20 The fairness doctrine thus
was conceived and administered as a mechanism for promoting balanced
programming. 2' As it evolved more formally, the doctrine imposed upon
broadcasters an affirmative obligation to provide reasonable amounts of
time for coverage of public issues" and a companion duty to ensure
opportunities for contrasting views.Y
Fairness regulation eventually was challenged as an invasion of broad-
casters' first amendment rights. 24 In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,25
however, the United States Supreme Court was concerned less with unfet-
tered editorial autonomy than it was with the implications of a purportedly
scarce medium. The Supreme Court noted that "[w]here there are substan-
tially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to
allocate," 2 6 the danger exists that some views and ideas might not reach the
citizenry. 27 Pursuant to that apprehension, the Red Lion Court identified a
public right "to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral
and other ideas and experiences" 28 and elevated the right above the first
18. See infra notes 37-39, 47 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 46.
20. See Great Lakes Broadcasting Company, 3 FRC Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), rev'd on other
grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
21. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377-389-91 (1969).
22. See Fairness Report, supra note 4, at 7.
23. See id.
24. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386.
25. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
26. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969).
27. Given the perceived 'possibility, attributed to scarcity of broadcasting frequencies,
that some views might not reach the public, the Supreme Court found the first amendment
did not preclude the government from insisting that broadcasters function as fiduciaries who
would present diverse views and voices. Id. at 389.
28. Id. at 390. By its terms, the first amendment protects speaking and publishing,
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amendment interests of broadcasters. 9 The Supreme Court and the FCC
presumed that the fairness doctrine would ensure comprehensive and bal-
anced coverage of public issues.3 0
The fairness doctrine, however, proved to deter rather than facilitate
robust and unfettered debate.3' Regulatory assumptions, for instance, failed
to account for such industrial realities as the tying of profitability to market
share. Profit optimization in radio and television necessitates audience
maximization and thus programming strategies catering largely to main-
stream tastes.3 2 Moreover, orthodox rather than provocative controversy
was facilitated as broadcasters hedged coverage in a fashion that would
minimize the risk of a fairness complaint. 33 Sentiment that presentation of
radical, adventurous or unpopular views would alienate the audience, as
well as advertisers, discouraged expression of these views.3 4 Presentation of
controversial issues was chilled further by the prospect of administrative,
reputational, and legal costs in the event of a fairness complaint.3 The
compilation of such concerns weighed against presentation of meaningful
editorials and political issue advertising in the electronic forum. 6
The fairness doctrine, even to the extent not vigorously enforced,
undermined not only its policy objectives but core first amendment interests.
By directing licensees to cover controversial issues and ensure that their
presentations were balanced, the FCC reserved for itself significant content-
based control over a prominent sector of the press. In administering the
fairness doctrine, the FCC probably erred in favor of broadcasters by
tending to assume good faith licensee judgment and discretion. 7 The finding
of a fairness doctrine violation38 was the exception in a system which allowed
broadcasters considerable latitude "in selecting the manner of coverage, the
activities that relate to informational sources and dissemination. The Court identified a
"collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the
first amendment," which were defined primarily in the interest of the viewing and listening
public. Id.
29. Thus, "the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
[became] paramount." Id.
30. See Fairness Report, supra note 4, at 7.
31. See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 5055 (1987).
32, See Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx.
L. Rnv. 207, 229 (1982); Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunication Press, 1975
DuiE L.J. 213, 231-32. Justice Brennan has noted that broadcasters assume "angry customers
are not good customers and ... it is simply 'bad business' to espouse-or even to allow
others to espouse-the heterodox or the controversial." CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 187 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5049.
34. See supra note 32.
35. See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5049-50.
36. See id. at 5050.
37. See Fairness Report, supra note 4, at 8, 23.
38. Of 4,280 fairness complaints received in 1973 and 1974, for instance, the FCC made
findings against licensees in only 19 instances. See Reconsideration of the Fairness Report,
supra note 14, at 709 (Comm'r Robinson dissenting).
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appropriate spokesmen, and the technique of production and presenta-
tion.,,9
Rather than making fairness regulation more palatable, the FCC's
deference further evinced the doctrine's inadequacy and undesirability. If
not enforced, the fairness doctrine was a regulatory charade. To the extent
the FCC might administer the fairness doctrine, however, the regulation
was capable of profound constitutional treachery. The fundamental consti-
tutional problem with the fairness doctrine was "that someone other than
the speaker ... with far-reaching enforcement powers ... ha[d] the task
of determining content."' 4 The Supreme Court already had authorized the
FCC to be more than a "traffic officer, policing the engineering and
technical aspects of broadcasting. ' 41 Pursuant to the scarcity rationale, the
FCC was allowed to concern itself with "program format and the kinds of
programs broadcast by licensees."1
42
The Supreme Court was inclined to countenance the FCC's use of wide-
ranging enforcement powers,4  moreover, if broadcasters proved to be
timorous in their programming." Given the overarching interest of broad-
casters in self-preservation and consequent susceptibility to "regulation by
lifted eyebrow,"14 the mere presence if not use of intimidating enforcement
devices constituted a threat to editorial autonomy and press independence.
The fairness doctrine enabled "administration after administration to toy
with radio or TV in order to serve ... sordid or ... benevolent ends."
46
To minimize the dangers of official content control, the FCC, as noted
previously, generally adhered to a policy of deference to licensee discretion. 47
Administrative leniency and restraint, rather than diminishing the adverse
consequences and potential of fairness regulation, further demonstrated its
futility. "Fairness" could not meaningfully promote diversity unless vigor-
ously enforced. Aggressive implementation, however, translated into intol-
erable government control of the editorial process.
39. Fairness Report, supra note 4, at 16.
40. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 14, at 707-08.
41. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943).
42. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 395 (1969).
43. Violation of the Communications Act of 1934 or rules promulgated thereunder may
result in revocation of a broadcaster's license, short-term renewal, nonrenewal or fine. See
Communications Act of 1934, §§ 3.07(d), 312(b), 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(d), 312(b) (1982).
44. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 395.
45. Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observation on 40 Years of Radio
and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 119 (1967). An informal inquiry or expression
of official concern may have a profound chilling effect upon the creativity and flexibility of
an industry dependent upon official authorization of its existence. See id. at 119-20.
46. See S. SnumoNs, THE FAiRNEss DOCRIUNE AND THE MEDiA 219-20 (1978) (discussing
manner in which fairness regulation invited misuse by several presidential administrations); see
also Fairness Report of 1985, supra note 12, at 192-94.
47. Balancing what it perceived as two evils, the FCC concluded that "further government
intrusion is less desirable than the possibility of occasional licensee lapses." In re Complaint
of Public Communication, Inc., 50 F.C.C.2d 395, 401 (1974).
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The Supreme Court and the FCC, in determining that scarcity was a
problem in broadcasting, essentially had reordered first amendment interests
as a calculated strategy for promoting first amendment values. 4 Official
judgment eventually began to acknowledge the wisdom of fairness critics,
however, as the Court invited the FCC to reexamine the foundation of and
need for the fairness doctrine.
49
Despite the Supreme Court's intimation that it might look favorably
upon administrative erasure of the fairness doctrine, and an appellate court
ruling that the provision was not justified by scarcity or mandated by
statute, 0 the FCC originally delayed action pending possible congressional
action.5' Congress, in fact, subsequently acted to codify the fairness doc-
trine.5 2 After President Reagan vetoed the measure, 53 however, the FCC
voted to abandon the fairness doctrine.
54
The FCC, having noted the practical failings and constitutional dangers
of mandated fairness, 5 concluded that the scarcity premise no longer applied
to the broadcast medium. 6 It further determined that first amendment goals
and principles would be served better by "extend[ing] to the electronic press
the same first amendment guarantees that the print media have enjoyed
since our country's inception. '5 7 A regulatory system of authoritative selec-
tion thus gave way, at least in part, to a marketplace system of autonomous
selection
s.5
II. NEW DOGMA FOR A DISCREDITED PRiNciPE
Official abandonment of the fairness doctrine did not settle the fairness
controversy. Legislative response to the FCC's decision included sentiment
48. The Supreme Court openly has acknowledged its construction of an "unusual order
of first amendment values." CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973).
49. When cable was still in a relatively infant stage, the Supreme Court noted that it
"will afford increased opportunities for the discussion of public issues." Id. at 131. A decade
later, the Court intimated its readiness to discard the scarcity rationale if it received a "signal
from Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far that some
revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required." FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 n.11 (1984).
50. See Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987).
51. See Fairness Report of 1985, supra note 12, at 1213-14.
52. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1987, at C26, col. 6.
53. See id., June 21, 1987, at 1, cols. 4-5.
54. See Fairness Alternatives, supra note 13.
55. See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 5049-59 (1987);
see also Fairness Alternatives, supra note 13, at 5275, 5293-94.
56. See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 4 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5045-55.
57. See F.C.C. Votes Down Fairness Doctrine in a 4-0 Decision, N.Y. Times, June 21,
1987, at 1, col. 6 (statement by FCC Chairman Patrick).
58. See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5055-57; Fairness
Alternatives, supra note 13, at 5276, 5295.
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that the agency was defying Congress' will.5 9 Because congressional support
for codification of the fairness doctrine had been widespread,60 reenactment
and presentation to a more sympathetic president are future possibilities.
Fairness advocates continue to regard the doctrine as a critical methodology
for ensuring propagation of pluralistic, especially minority, views.
61
Those who would resurrect the doctrine assert that, despite a panoply
of new information sources, the growth of broadcasting itself has been
limited primarily to independent UHF stations that do not contribute
significantly to diversity. 62 Fairness exponents note further that an increased
number of signals overall has not necessarily expanded the number of signals
originating locally. 63 New outlets regardless of source or origin, however,
afford new options for receiving information. A focus upon type and
location of signal introduces a concern that is too pinched to justify
tampering with constitutional guarantees. It stretches the scarcity premise
even further beyond limits of reason to address not just a particular category
of media but subcategory of a specific medium. Even if structural diversity
has not translated into rollicking viewpoint diversity, 64 first amendment
goals would seem better facilitated by policy that is attuned to a broader
reality and more obviously befriends unprompted editorial vitality.
The case for fairness regulation can rely upon some instances in which
it undeniably proved to be socially beneficial. The FCC's determination that
tobacco advertising had to be balanced by competing expression65 engendered
a proliferation of public service messages that graphically delineated the
health hazards of smoking. 6 Such counterspeech is considered largely re-
sponsible for a decline in cigarette smoking among Americans. 67 The anti-
smoking spots were so effective that the tobacco lobby itself was moved to
favor a facially more oppressive total prohibition of broadcast cigarette
advertising. 6s
59. The chairman of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, for instance,
characterized the FCC's abandonment of the fairness doctrine as "a 'rancid dish' served up
by a Commission bent on defying the will of Congress." N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1987, at C26,
col. 6.
60. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Congress had voted to codify the fairness
doctrine. Id.
61. Critics of the FCC's decision to abolish the fairness doctrine, for instance, assert
that issues including women's rights, the health hazards of smoking, nuclear power plant
safety and minority views would have received less prominent coverage without the requirements
of the fairness doctrine. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1987, at C26, col. 6.
62. See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 5051 (1987).
63. See Fairness Alternatives, supra note 13, at 5291.
64. See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5051.
65. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969).
66. See Capital Broadcasting, Inc. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 587 (D.D.C. 1971)
(Wright, J., dissenting), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
67. See id. at 587-89.
68. See id. at 588-89.
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Critics of the decision to abolish the fairness doctrine are concerned
that broadcasters now can disregard important issues and will provide one-
sided programming reflecting establishment or majoritarian values. 6 9 Such
worry ignores a fundamental lesson of the fairness doctrine experience
itself-that the threat of sanctions or audience loss already has fostered
unduly timid, bland and culturally nonpluralistic programming. 70 The FCC's
own inquiry into broadcasting practices bore out the argument of critics
that the fairness doctrine caused broadcasters to shy away from controversial
issues.7'
Despite occasional social if not constitutional triumphs, fairness gov-
ernance has impeded the objectives of robust debate and viewpoint diversity.
The isolated benefits of fairness regulation, moreover, must be measured
against the doctrine's overall performance in promoting its objectives. When
balanced against perceived problems of scarcity, the case for fairness reg-
ulation may have been more facially appealing if not genuinely persuasive.
7
2
Given the abatement of scarcity as an even arguable concern, it is unlikely
that a newly packaged fairness principle, any more than its doctrinal
antecedent, can satisfy demands of sound policy and constitutional integrity.
If the FCC's decision to diminish regulation of the information mar-
ketplace is vulnerable to criticism, it is susceptible on grounds that dereg-
ulation is incomplete and the reality of governance still diverges from theory.
In abolishing the fairness doctrine, the FCC observed that it was elevating
the first amendment rights of broadcasters to a constitutional par with those
of publishers.7 It thus asserted that the dangers of an unfettered broadcast
medium are less profound than those of a regulated one. 74 The statement
of principle is misleading, however, insofar as personal attack and political
editorial rules and other constitutionally derogating terms of governance
survive.7 5 Even if the future of fairness-type rules is ordained76 by the
devolution of the scarcity premise to which they too have been tied,"n
opportunities remain for official treachery in regard to broadcasters' first
amendment rights.
With almost the same breath that it used to pronounce equal first
amendment status for broadcasters and publishers, the FCC concluded that
curbs upon indecent or offensive programming, although unconstitutional
69. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1987, at C26, col. 6.
70. See supra notes 31-36, 43.46 and accompanying text.
71. See Fairness Alternatives, supra note 13, at 5274; Fairness Report of 1985, supra
note 12, at 1151-74.
72. Even at the time of- Red Lion, when the Court upheld the fairness doctrine against
constitutional challenge, the number of radio and television stations, collectively and for the
most part in individual markets, outnumbered daily newspapers. See infra note 89.
73. See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 5055-57 (1987).
74, See id. at 5057.
75. See Fairness Alternatives, supra note 13, at 5285; N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1987, at C26,
col. I.
76. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1987, at C26, col. I.
77. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-92 (1969).
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if applied to publishers, were not incongruent with its statement of parity.78
Because radio and television are officially described as uniquely intrusive,
pervasive and accessible to children, 9 special controls remain in place to
safeguard against purportedly indecent or offensive programming. 80 Unlike
fairness regulation, which on its face was a diversity enhancement scheme,
such indecency controls patently are diversity restrictive. Such governance
constitutes an abiding threat to expression that transcends mainstream or
orthodox thinking8 and is overtly hostile toward the declaration of consti-
tutional parity betokening the end of the fairness doctrine. Expressive
pluralism thus remains hostage to the persisting discrepancy, accentuated
further by its purported dispatch, between official rhetoric and action.
IH. THE DuBious CONSTITUTIONALITrY OF A FAmuwss RPvivL
The Supreme Court, in eventually intimating that it was prepared to
reexamine the underpinnings of the fairness doctrine, 2 fashioned a higher
standard for judging constitutionality than it originally seemed to have
employed. 3 Despite the first amendment interests implicated by the fairness
doctrine, the Court in Red Lion largely deferred to the administrative
judgment of the FCC. 4 A decade and a half later, in FCC v. League of
Women Voters,85 however, the Court articulated a more exacting standard
of review. Fairness regulation would not survive now unless found to
promote a substantial state objective in a fashion that least burdens first
amendment interests.8 6
If the fairness doctrine were resurrected, therefore, its constitutionality
would be subject not only to force of reason but a higher standard of
review. Government may have a substantial interest in promoting diversity.-
Fairness regulation, however, has proved to be a means of chilling rather
78. See Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 2706, 2706-07 n.16 (1987). For a
detailed examination of the persisting disparities in first amendment standards, see Lively,
Deregulatory illusions and Broadcasting: The First Amendment's Enduring Forked Tongue,
66 N.C.L. REv. 963 (1988).
79. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
80. See id.
81. See id at 776-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376-79 nn.I1l2 (1984).
83. See id. at 380.
84. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969). Despite the implication
of fundamental constitutional interests, which usually necessitates proof of a compelling or
substantial governmental rationale, the Court stated that policy formulated "by those charged
with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong."
rd.
85. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
86. See id. at 380.
87. Media concentration and limited opportunities for access to the media, either as an
entrepreneur or citizen, represent a significant concern especially to the extent coverage is
undiversified and the public's ability to participate in public debate has diminished. See Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248-52 (1974).
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than facilitating such expression."8 Reliance upon the dynamics of the
information marketplace, moreover, affords an alternative for promoting
first amendment values in a fashion that is less burdensome to traditional
first amendment rights.
The central premise for fairness regulation has been discredited to the
point that it cannot be reconstituted in a principled fashion. As a regulatory
predicate, the scarcity rationale was fundamentally flawed in both its origin
and operation. At the time Red Lion was decided, broadcasting stations
outnumbered daily newspapers. 89 In subsequent years, radio and television
constituted an expanding industry, while the newspaper business declined
or at best remained static. 90 Especially in metropolitan areas, which increas-
ingly became single newspaper towns, the number of broadcasters far
exceeded the number of daily publishers.91
Even if scarcity is defined in allocational rather than purely numerical
terms, it would not afford a satisfactory rationale for reinstating the fairness
doctrine. 92 Distinctions, tied to the notion that anyone can publish but only
a finite number of individuals can be allocated a license to broadcast, 93 are
simplistic and misplaced. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 9 the
Supreme Court, although never actually distinguishing scarcity in broad-
casting from publishing, nonetheless concluded that economic scarcity im-
posed no artificial barriers to publishing and thus could not justify an
official fairness scheme.95 Because licenses may be transferred and broadcast
operations sold,9 however, scarcity in broadcasting is not so readily distin-
guishable from scarcity in the print media. If it may be assumed that most
entrepreneurs will sell if offered the right price, and entry into broadcasting
thus is contingent upon raising sufficient capital, the barriers to entering
either broadcasting or publishing are largely economic. Financial resources,
88. See supra notes 31-36, 43-46 and accompanying "text.
89. In 1970 only 1,748 newspapers published daily. See STATSTcAL ABsTRACT 1987,
supra note 5, at 536. During the same year, 862 television stations and 6,519 radio stations
were in operation. See id. at 531. The presence of 55 radio and television stations in the largest
market, New York, and 4 radio and television outlets in the smallest market, Glendive,
Montana, further demonstrates that numerical scarcity is more an attribute of the daily
newspaper industry than broadcasting. See 1983 BROADCASTING/CABLECASn NG YEARBOOK B-
146, B-166, B-167, C-31, C-35, C-208.
90. By 1985, 1,676 daily newspapers were in existence. See STATIsTICAL ABSTRACT 1987,
supra note 5, at 537. A total of 9,775 radio and television stations were in operation in 1985.
See id at 531. By 1986, a total of 7,600 expanding cable systems served 37.5 million subscribers.
See id.
91. See supra note 89.
92. Allocational scarcity refers to the limits upon broadcasting opportunities attributable
to licensing.
93. See Miami Herald Publishing Co.. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974). The Court
has noted that economic factors that have fostered a declining number of newspapers also
have made entry into the field almost impossible. See id. at 249-51.
94. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
95. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
96. See Communications Act of 1934, § 310(d), 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1981 & Supp. 1988).
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more than any theoretical scarcity, are the most pertinent factor limiting
entrepreneurial opportunities with respect to any mass medium. The niceties
of spectrum limitations are lost upon all but a few citizens, who possess
sufficient funds to broadcast or publish commercially. A realistic under-
standing of the actual barriers to entrepreneurship, regardless of the nature
of the medium, further militates toward similar rather than disparate con-
stitutional standards.
Traditionally, the Court has regarded each new medium97 as being beset
by "its own peculiar problems" and concluded that those differences justify
variances in first amendment standards governing them.98 In broadcasting,
that analytical departure point led to the identification of spectrum scarcity
and consequent construction of fairness policies. By regarding different
media in different ways, the Court created a first amendment hierarchy in
which constitutional guarantees were maximized for the print media but
diminished for newer media. 9 Official focus upon the extent of diversity in
one medium, however, betrays insensitivity to the reality and greater sig-
nificance of intermedia competition. 1°° The citizenry, even at the time of
Red Lion, received information from multiple sources. Two decades later,
especially due to the expansion of cable and other new technologies, the
public has even more opportunities for receiving diversified information.
Even if the scarcity rationale is no longer credible enough to support
reintroduction of fairness regulation, the doctrine's proposed renewal could
be tied to more generalized regulatory notions. Radio and television are
subject to governance based upon the "public convenience, interest or
necessity."' 0' It is well-established that such a standard "means about as
little as any phrase that" legislators can craft. 02 Especially due to its
malleability, most recently evidenced by the crafting of separate laws for
indecent or offensive broadcasting,'0 the public interest concept remains a
starting point for regulatory mischief.1 4 Experience should have demon-
strated how fairness undermines rather than services the citizenry's interest
97. New media generally are those media, such as radio, television, motion pictures and
cable, that have emerged in the Twentieth Century.
98. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 n.8 (1981); FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 744-46 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 386 (1969); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952); Quincy Cable
TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
99. The Court thus has stated that broadcasting is the least constitutionally protected
medium. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
100. See Lively, Fear and the Media: A First Amendment Horror Show, 69 MMn. L.
REv. 1071, 1094-95 (1985).
101. Communications Act of 1934, § 303, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1981 & Supp. 1988).
102. Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity as Used in the
Radio Act of 1927, 1 Am. L. REv. 295, 296 (1930).
103. See supra note 78.
104. Prior to the Supreme Court's linkage of the fairness doctrine to the scarcity concept,
one court found that the FCC's power to regulate in the public interest justified the fairness
doctrine. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1092-93 (1968).
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in content diversity. An understanding that broadcasting exists and functions
within instead of apart from a media universe, if not enough to engender
comprehensive constitutional parity regardless of how information is dissem-
inated, perhaps may suffice at least to preclude reintroduction of miscon-
ceived fairness expectations.
Given the evolution and interaction of the modern press, media specific
analysis focusing upon the defects of a particular medium is obsolete. Cable
television competes against broadcasting, for instance, but not by appealing
to the least common denominator or with bland programming. Profit
maximization in the cable industry, to the contrary, is tied to discrete
programming that may appeal to some, offend others, but nevertheless
promotes pluralistic expression. 0 5
Structural expansion of the press has engendered dissemination of
information from increasingly diverse sources. Even assuming a substantial
state interest in promoting diversity, content regulation nonetheless cannot
be justified given the availability of less restrictive marketplace alternatives.
Competition among different media begets, if not always full and balanced
presentations by a particular outlet or medium, coverage that is more
comprehensive, fair, and free in the crucial panoramic sense. Microregula-
tion intended to advance first amendment values in one industry, but
disregarding the broader context and workings of the press, has proved to
be too narrowly focused and ultimately disruptive of first amendment
interests. The lessons of fairness and realities of modern media suggest that
first amendment concerns are served better by policies which promote rather
than restrain editorial autonomy.
105. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U-S. 691, 698-700 (1984); Quincy Cable
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